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This paper examines the nature of mortgage credit rationing across geographic markets and
time. Particular attention is paid to the response of conventional mortgage supply to higher risk
conditions associated with regional recessions. We develop a series of four indirect tests based
on the spatial variation of the FHA share of mortgages, both endorsements and applications, as
well as FHA and conventional rejection rates. Results of these four tests indicate that
conventional mortgage underwriting criteria do not become more flexible and may even become
more demanding when local economic conditions deteriorate. This result indicates the use of
non-price credit rationing in the mortgage market and suggests a special role for FHA-insured
mortgages as a mechanism for maintaining mortgage credit supply in declining housing markets.

1. INTRODUCTION
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In this paper, we test the nature and existence of non-price credit rationing in single-family
residential mortgage markets in the United States by exploiting the institutional fact that
conventional lenders, including private mortgage insurers (PMIs), are free to vary conventional
underwriting criteria across spatial markets (but not within markets), whereas the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) imposes spatially uniform underwriting standards for all FHAinsured mortgages.2 Thus, in originating FHA and conventional mortgages, lenders in spatially
defined mortgage markets across the United States are free to alter conventional mortgage
underwriting criteria to reflect changing economic conditions while also offering FHA-insured
mortgages with uniform underwriting criteria.

In areas experiencing an economic downturn, the risk of mortgage lending increases and the
percentage of low-risk mortgage applicants falls. The resulting decline in demand for lower-risk
conventional mortgages means that conventional lenders must cut prices if they are to maintain
their market share in declining areas. Cutting price explicitly, in the form of lower mortgage rates
or insurance fees, is inconsistent with observed price invariance over space.3 Thus, if
conventional lenders attempt to maintain their market share in declining (higher risk) areas, they
must do so by relaxing underwriting criteria. Alternatively, conventional lenders may maintain
underwriting standards and allow their market share to fall as fewer applicants are able to
qualify. We develop a number of indirect tests for non-price rationing by conventional lenders in
response to local differences in economic conditions, based on the implications of that behavior
for the relative shares of FHA and conventional mortgage activity.

Recently expanded Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reporting requirements covering
virtually all mortgage banking firms allow for the observation of spatial variation in patterns of
applications, endorsements, and rejections for both conventional and FHA mortgages.
Supplementing HMDA data with FHA internal records allows us to characterize the risk structure
of FHA endorsements. Thus, for the first time, we can test a number of hypotheses concerning
2

The GAO [18] notes that, under FHA program guidelines, FHA mortgage underwriting criteria and premium
structure do not deviate across geographic locations. Although conventional lenders and PMI maintain spatially
uniform pricing structures (Duca and Rosenthal [8]), they may vary underwriting criteria spatially. The FHA may vary
underwriting guidelines to a limited extent in response to Presidential decrees following natural disasters; however,
these variations are highly localized.
3

For a recent theoretical treatment that predicts a mortgage market equilibrium characterized by non-price rationing,
see Brueckner [2]. Furthermore, Duca and Rosenthal [8] note that Fair Lending Laws make it difficult for lenders to
differentially price applicants based on applicant risk
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the nature of credit rationing by conventional mortgage lenders. We also find that substantial
variation in the FHA’s share of mortgage activity persists even after adjusting for the effects of
the FHA loan limits and for the institutional composition of local mortgage markets.

We are not aware of any previous similar study of FHA market shares that considers the full
range of applications, endorsements, and rejections analyzed here. However, there is a
literature on FHA mortgage choice that relies on survey microdata from the American Housing
Survey (AHS), the Survey of Consumer Finances, or similar surveys.4 Because these surveys
examine relatively few new mortgages each year in each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
studies using them cannot evaluate spatial variation in credit rationing behavior between FHA
and conventional lenders. Indeed, these studies implicitly assume that underwriting criteria do
not vary spatially.

We devise a series of tests designed to detect the nature of credit rationing for conventional
mortgages in spatially distinct mortgage markets, specifically MSAs. In contrast to other studies,
we take advantage of the unique position of the FHA as a specialized high-cost, high-risk,
spatially invariant insurance program in constructing our tests. Appropriate tests for the nature
of credit rationing in mortgage markets require examination of the way in which a number of
market indicators, in addition to FHA market share, vary with risk. Accordingly, we first present a
model of market responses to shifting MSA credit risk conditions and then perform a number of
tests based on this model. The empirical results are consistent with the findings of Duca and
Rosenthal [7] and indicate that FHA market shares increase as economic uncertainty increases.
Taken together, these tests provide a substantial indication of the role of spatial risk differentials
and credit rationing by conventional lenders in mortgage lending.

2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF MORTGAGE CREDIT RATIONING
Following Hendershott et al. [12], we assume homebuyers recognize that the cost of FHA
mortgage insurance relative to the cost of private mortgage insurance (PMI) varies based on
loan-to-value and other characteristics, with conventional PMI being more (less) expensive for

4

For example, a number of researchers, including Linneman and Wachter [13], Gabriel and Rosenthal [10],
Goodman and Nichols [11], and Hendershott et al. [12] have used microdata on individual households to study the
choice between conventional and government-insured mortgages.
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borrowers seeking high (low) loan-to-value mortgages.5 Accordingly, applicants trade off
constraints on house value and higher required down payments for the lower cost of
conventional mortgages. These arguments are part of an established theoretical literature
backed by empirical testing using microdata on individual households.6 Goodman and Nichols
[11] introduce the term “FHA wedge” to describe the group of applicants whose loan-to-value
ratio is between 95% and 100% and/or have a front end ratio between 28% and 33%. Such
applicants are very likely to be rejected for conventional mortgages but are likely to qualify
for FHA-insured mortgages.

Following an approach used by Ferguson and Peters [9], we assume that all relevant
information concerning the applicant’s ability to qualify for a mortgage, including credit history,
collateral quality, and loan terms, can be quantified by a “mortgage credit score.” Credit risk, Φ,
is a monotonically increasing function that captures the borrower’s probability of default.7 Each
lender sets uniform underwriting standards such that all applicants with a credit risk above a
minimum acceptable risk level, Φ∗ , are rejected, whereas all applicants with a credit risk below

Φ∗ are accepted. The marginal probability density function of an applicant’s risk is

Φ , and

Φ is the cumulative density function.
The probability that a borrower applies for a FHA mortgage is a function of both the borrower’s
credit risk (Φ) and the lenders’ conventional underwriting standards (Φ ). Households with Φ
significantly below Φ are very likely to choose lower-cost conventional mortgages. However,
some households, fearing possible rejection for conventional loans, apply for FHA insurance,
although their credit risk is below the conventional standard (Φ

Φ ), whereas other

households, less concerned with possible rejection than with insurance cost, apply for
conventional loans with Φ

Φ . Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15] demonstrate that although

the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of credit scores reported by the Fair, Isaac and
Company (FICO) for FHA and conventional borrowers have considerable overlap, the
5

For borrowers with high loan-to-value mortgages (greater than 95%), FHA insurance premiums are lower than PMI
premiums. For borrowers at the 95% LTV cutoff, the relative cost advantage or disadvantage of FHA over PMI
depends upon a number of factors, including whether the applicant qualifies for the first-time home buyer credit or the
central city discount credit rationing

6

See Linneman and Wachter [13], Gabriel and Rosenthal [10], Zorn [20], Sa-Aadu and Sirmans [16], Goodman and
Nichols [11], and Hendershott et al. [12].
7

We normalize Φ such that Φ ∈ 0,1 .
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probability of applying to FHA decreases monotonically with increasing FICO scores. Thus, if we
assume that Φ can be interpreted as the inverse of the credit score, then we can define

Φ; Φ

as the share of FHA applicants at a given risk level indexed by Φ, given current

conventional lending standards (Φ ) Thus,

Φ; Φ

is an increasing function of Φ. Following

Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15], we note that because mortgage insurance charges for
lower-risk conventional mortgages are generally lower than FHA insurance rates,

Φ; Φ

is

approximately 0 when Φ ≪ Φ and increases monotonically until it equals unity at some
value Φ̓ , where Φ

Φ̓

Φ and Φ is the upper limit of credit risk acceptable to the FHA.

We consider the case of a spatially defined, local market where lenders offer both conventional
and government-insured (FHA) mortgage products.8 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of
applicant outcomes in this market. The marginal density function of credit risk

Φ is drawn,

reflecting the empirical fact noted by Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15] that the peak of the
marginal density function falls at a level of credit risk less than the maximum credit risk
acceptable given conventional underwriting standards, indicated by Φ .

We note that the fraction of all applicants who apply for an FHA mortgage,

Φ , given that the

risk distribution of the population is characterized by
Φ , is given by

Φ

Φ

In Fig. 1, the value of A ∙ is given by S
result in an endorsed FHA mortgage,

Φ ;Φ
The value of E ∙ is given by S

T

Φ.

Φ; Φ

(1)

V. The fraction of all mortgage applications that

Φ ;Φ

is

Φ

;Φ

Φ

(2)

T in Fig. 1. The fraction of all mortgage applications resulting

in denial of FHA mortgage insurance,

Φ ; Φ , is

8

The two loan products may either be offered by different lenders or, more likely, by a single lender. Applicants select
the type of product that they prefer. Institutionally, it is often true that loan underwriting is segmented by loan product.
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Φ ;Φ

Φ

Φ

Φ; Φ

(3)

The region V in Fig. 1 represents D( ∙ ). Similar relations can be developed for shares of
applications, endorsements, and denials for conventional lenders, recognizing that their share of
applications for individuals with credit risk Φ is simply 1

Φ; Φ

.

All applicants with credit risk Φ greater than Φ are rejected for conventional mortgages, either
by the lender or by the mortgage insurer. We assume that the lender can vary conventional
underwriting standards, Φ , whereas the FHA has fixed underwriting standards, Φ . Thus, we
can test whether various market shares change differentially, depending on the flexibility of
conventional underwriting standards. Although we are not able to observe the actual credit risk
( Φ )distribution, we know that most applicants succeed in qualifying for conventional loans
and have an incentive to provide credit enhancements, principally an additional down payment,
to qualify for lower-cost PMI.9 Other applicants are unable to provide these enhancements, and
they fall into the shaded region T in Fig. 1 between Φ and Φ , known as the “FHA wedge.”
This is the portion of the distribution of applications that would be rejected by conventional
lenders and accepted by FHA.10

We are interested in the effects of a shift in credit risk due to changing economic conditions. A
downturn in the local economy causes the probability density function of applicant risk
shift to

Φ . Thus,

Φ reflects an increase in risk in that

(Φ)

Φ to

Φ ∀Φ. We follow

Ferguson and Peters [9] in defining an increase in risk as a shift in the risk distribution of
mortgage applicants such that

Φ first order stochastically dominates (FOSD)

Φ .

We develop testable hypotheses about the differential effects of alternative responses of
conventional lenders to increases in credit risk that result when

Φ FOSD

Φ shifts to

Φ , where

Φ . Specifically, we form a series of testable hypotheses that allow us to

determine the effects of changes in the underwriting criteria of conventional lenders and PMI
underwriters in response to increases in local economic risk on (1) the FHA share of
9

In fact, many borrowers put just enough down to qualify for conventional financing, thus producing a hump at the
conventional lending limit.
10
In essence, these are the applications for which FHA has no competition—the modest share of the FHA wedge
applying for conventional credit and being rejected possibly reflects imperfect information on the part of applicants.
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applications, (2) the FHA share of originations, (3) the FHA rejection rate, and (4) the
conventional rejection rate.11 Each of these four tests can be rigorously derived based on an
analysis of Eqs. (1)–(3).12

First, consider the case where conventional lenders do not alter underwriting standards in
response to an increase in local economic risk. Figure 2 shows this market equilibrium in which

Φ is constant, i.e., conventional underwriting criteria are inflexible, or lenders engage in
complete non-price rationing. When Φ remains constant and

Φ FOSD
of applicants,

Φ , then

Φ

Φ, Φ

Φ shifts to

Φ , where

increases monotonically. It follows that the FHA share

Φ , and the FHA share of originations,

Φ , Φ , increase accordingly.

Because the FHA underwriting criteria are constant, the effect on the FHA rejection rate is
ambiguous, because both the share of FHA applicants and the number of FHA rejections
increase. This leads to a counterintuitive result—that as the risk distribution increases, the FHA
rejection rate does not necessarily increase as well. However, because conventional
underwriting criteria remain constant in response to an increase in local risk, conventional
endorsements will be lower while the FHA wedge increases. Thus, our theory predicts that the
conventional rejection rate will rise.13

Now consider the case where conventional lenders relax their underwriting standards in
response to an increase in local economic risk, as illustrated in Figure 3. This hypothesis is
consistent with the Government-Sponsored Enterprises’ (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac)
charters to maintain mortgage credit in declining markets. Furthermore, conventional lenders
have a high ratio of fixed to variable cost, suggesting that they would lower prices (i.e., relax
underwriting standards) to maintain market share in the face of falling demand. It is important to
recognize that increasing credit risk appears to the conventional lender as a decline in demand
because the number of qualified mortgage applicants falls. The impact on the FHA’s share of
11

Because part of the mission of FHA is the maintenance of mortgage supply in declining markets, Φ should not
change because of changes in local economic risks. Weicher [19] notes that, as a result of the dramatic increase in
mortgage defaults during the Great Depression, Congress created the FHA to help restore stability to the housing
finance system. Subsequently this role has been interpreted as requiring that the FHA maintain the supply of
mortgage credit in geographically concentrated recessions by providing mortgage insurance when local economic
conditions deteriorate, and particularly by ignoring risks associated with falling home prices.

12

A formal derivation is available from the authors upon request.

13

This result rests upon the assumption that the peak of the applicant risk distribution is less than Φ , which is
consistent with the empirical findings of Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15].
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applications is ambiguous, because both

Φ

Φ; Φ

and Φ are shifting. However, the

increase in Φ will reduce the FHA share of originations. The reasoning is as follows: if
conventional lenders increase Φ to maintain their market share, and if total applications are
unchanged, and if the FOSD condition ensures that the number of FHA rejections increases
(because Φ does not change), then FHA originations must fall by the same amount by which
the number of FHA rejections rises. Similarly, if the number of FHA rejections increases and
FHA originations fall, then the FHA rejection rate must rise. Finally, we note that the effect of
increasing Φ on the conventional rejection rate is ambiguous. Table 1 summarizes the
predicted effects on applications, originations, and rejection rates by an increase in local
economic risk under the two scenarios for conventional lender reaction to a decline in demand.

3. EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR THE NATURE OF MORTGAGE CREDIT RATIONING

Table 2 reports the geographic variation in the FHA share of FHA-eligible mortgages, i.e., those
meeting the maximum mortgage limit. Market shares are calculated from information contained
in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database, from which we identify FHA-eligible
loans as either (1) FHA-insured originations and applications for owner-occupied home
purchase loans, excluding refinancing, or (2) conventional (excluding Veterans Administration
and Farmers Home Administration loans) originations and applications for owner-occupied
home purchase loans, excluding refinancing, that meet the FHA loan limits.14 15 The market
shares are calculated for 307 MSAs, and population-weighted averages are computed for the
respective HUD Regions during the 1995–1996 period for which extended HMDA coverage is
available. Given that the FHA loan limit varies across MSAs, the loan amount needed for FHA
eligibility is county specific.16 Standard deviations reflect MSA deviations in FHA share within

14

The dataset contains all FHA-eligible conventional loans as identified by HMDA, including
those originated by subprime lenders. However, because the analysis is confined to purchase mortgage loans (not
refinance loans), the number of subprime loans in the dataset is extremely small (approximately less than 1%).
15

Because FHA loan limits vary within each year, we use the weighted average loan limit, where the weight is the
number of months the limit is in force, as indicated by a HUD Mortgagee Letter or the Federal Register.

16

The FHA defines loan limits by MSA and country, grouped into high and standard cost areas. All standard cost
areas have the same loan limit, whereas all high-cost areas, whether a county or MSA, have a more lenient loan limit.
For most high-cost areas, the loan limit is defined as 95% of the median house price, but substantial local office
discretion is allowed in setting the 95% loan limits. This 95% rule holds until it is greater than 75% of the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) loan limit, at which point the FHA loan limit is reset to 75% of the
FHLMC loan limit. All loans in the HMDA data set that have a county identifier are included as part of the FHA market
if the loan is less than or equal to the loan limit set for the county.
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each HUD Region. Geographic divergences, other than the large Rocky Mountain share, are
modest, as are differences over time. The differences by MSA within each state are more
dramatic, sometimes exceeding a factor of 10.17 This is significant because many aspects of the
institutional and regulatory environment governing mortgage markets are essentially uniform
within a state. These very substantial differences in the FHA share of FHA-eligible mortgages
remain to be explained.

To test the hypotheses outlined above, we calculate four alternative share variables: (1) FHA
share of total FHA-eligible mortgage loans originating in MSA i in year t, (2) FHA share of all
applications for FHA-eligible mortgage loans originating in MSA i in year t, (3) the FHA rejection
rate, and (4) the conventional rejection rate for FHA-eligible loans. Based on the comparative
static results from the previous section, we examine the nature of geographic variation in these
market shares by estimating a series of reduced-form models that fit the generic form
̓,

where

is a vector of various “share” variables (explained above) across i = 307 MSAs and t =

2 years (1995 and 1996), the

’s are vectors of parameters to be estimated,

variables reflecting cyclical economic conditions in the MSA economy,
permanent indicators of MSA economic conditions,
characteristics of the minority population,

is a vector of

is a vector of relatively

is a vector of variables indicating

is a vector of lender share variables indicating

the fraction of mortgage originations made by different types of institutions in the previous year,
is a vector of HUD regional dummies, T is a time dummy indicating observations from 1995,
and

is an identically and independently distributed random error term. Table 3 contains a

listing of all variables used in the model along with descriptive statistics.

Because the market shares (

) are proportions of a population, they should be treated as

grouped observations. With grouped data, the unconditional variance is
where

1

is the number of observed events in MSA i in year t used to calculate

/

,

. As a result,

the efficiency of the estimator of β is underestimated. Because the market shares are based on
different numbers of observations in each MSA, the variance of the estimates differs by MSA
17

Results are available upon request.
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depending on

. To control for this difference in variances, we estimate Eq. (10) via maximum

likelihood as a logistic probability model with unscaled weighting, where

is the weighting

variable. This procedure often produces very small standard errors, leading to large t -statistics,
suggesting statistical significance. We also report the marginal effects to infer economic impact.

3.1.

Cyclical Risk Factors

To capture the shifts in the risk density function we include several variables designed to
measure cyclical changes in economic risk associated with a particular MSA, including
measures of housing, labor, and lending market conditions. Specifically, the local cyclical risk
measures include the change in local house prices, the change in unemployment, and the
percentage change in delinquent bank loans. Yearly changes ∆

in house prices are

estimated from the Freddie Mac MSA Repeat Sales Index. Empirical studies of credit risk have
demonstrated a negative relation between house price appreciation and default loss (see
Capozza et al. [4], Deng and Calhoun [6], and Ambrose and Capone [1]).

On average, local area house prices increased by 4.3% over the previous year. However, wide
variation exists across the country, ranging from a 7.1% decline (Honolulu, HI) to a 12.6%
increase (Provo–Orem, UT) over the previous year. Cyclical changes in the labor market are
measured by the yearly change in the local unemployment rate ∆

, with increases in the

unemployment rate indicating areas experiencing labor market distress. As with the housing
market, borrower credit risk deteriorates in areas experiencing local recessions, and thus FHA
market share should be higher in areas with increasing unemployment rates. Even during this
period of generally robust economic conditions, many MSAs experienced a dramatic increase in
unemployment rate.

To measure cyclical changes in the local creditworthiness of applicants, we include the
percentage change in delinquency rate of bank loans in the previous year ∆

as reported

18

by the American Bankers Association. The delinquency rate is reported by state and includes
all consumer loans (e.g., credit cards and personal lines of credit). Thus, we anticipate that FHA
market share should increase in areas experiencing higher levels of financial stress.
18

Clauretie and Herzog [5] show that state foreclosure laws vary across states and do affect mortgage losses.
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Permanent Risk Factors

3.2.

To measure the different shapes and positions of risk density functions across MSAs we include
long-term measures of housing, employment, and demographic factors. For instance, MSAs
with lower historical variation in the Freddie Mac repeat sales index, indicating more stable rates
of house price change, are expected to be perceived as lower-risk areas. Because the cyclical
risk factor ∆
or

∆

controls for the house price appreciation trend, we use its standard deviation,

, to measure the volatility of the average growth rate of house prices. Greater volatility is

associated with greater credit risk. A variety of institutional factors, including state laws
governing bankruptcy and foreclosure, influence local credit risk. We incorporate a measure of
these effects in the form of the average default rate for the previous 6 years for each state
.

Based on previous research, we expect credit risk to be higher in areas with higher proportions
of younger, lower-income households. We incorporate two income variables measuring these
demographic characteristics associated with credit risk. One is the percentage of home buyers
with income less than $20,000 (INC < 20). As the percentage of lower-income home buyers
increases, we expect a permanent increase in credit risk among mortgage applicants.

On average, 11% of home buyers fall into this category. However, the fraction of lower-income
home buyers ranges from 0.2% (Nassau–Suffolk, NY) to over 30% (Sumter, SC). The other is
the percentage of loans where the ratio of the loan amount to borrower income is greater than
three (LTI > 3), which identifies areas with high house prices relative to income levels.19 On
average, 5.7% of home buyers are classified as income constrained by this measure. Again,
wide variation exists in this measure ranging from a minimum of 0.1% (Wichita Falls, TX) to a
minimum of 51.5% (Honolulu, HI). As the fraction of the FHA-eligible market with LTI > 3
increases, we expect the risk probability density function to shift to the right.

3.3.

19

Minority Population

As a data quality control check, we follow Bunce and Scheessele [3] and exclude all loans with LTV greater than 6.
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Previous research has indicated that the FHA tends to differentially serve minority borrowers.20
Accordingly, we include variables reflecting the percentage of minority applicants and the extent
of housing market segregation. Using HMDA, we calculate the percentage of loan applications
under the FHA loan limit by black applicants (BLACK). The fraction of black applicants averages
6% and ranges from 0 (Dubuque, IA; Eau Claire, WI; Billings, MT; Bismark, ND; Laredo, TX;
Medford, OR; Rapid City, SD; Wausau, WI) to 42.5% (Sumter, SC). We also incorporate a proxy
for the level of local segregation (BGINI) to determine whether the FHA market share varies
depending on the level of racial segregation. BGINI measures the spatial distribution of different
groups across the local region and is derived from the Lorenz curve with values between 0.0
and 1.0, with 1.0 indicating maximum segregation (see Massey and Denton [14]).21 For our
sample, we find that the average MSA has a BGINI coefficient of 0.3, ranging from a minimum
of 0.03 (Burlington, VT) to a maximum of 0.77 (Gary, IN).

3.4.

Lender Share Variables

Finally, the variety of types of firms offering mortgage credit in the local market may have a
direct effect on FHA market share of FHA-eligible mortgages. We capture the wide variety of
lending institution types with a series of variables reflecting the government agencies collecting
mortgage activity from lenders. For example, mortgage bankers, who report their mortgage
activity to HUD, have historically had a closer association with FHA than with depository
institutions, which report to a variety of regulatory agencies, including the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Thus, we include the percentage of loans
originated that were reported to HUD (mortgage bankers), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the
National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, with the
percentage of loans reported to HUD serving as the reference variable in the regression
analysis. We note that substantial variation exists in the types of lenders originating mortgages
in local markets. For example, the percentage of lenders reporting to HUD ranges from 3.7%

20

21

For example, see Shear and Yeser [17] for a discussion of the attractiveness of FHA to minority borrowers.

BGINI is calculated from the 1990 census block data.
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(Enid, OK) to 74.0% (Bakersfield, CA). In addition, banks and thrifts originate a large segment of
loans, since lenders reporting to either the OCC or OTS originate 38.5% of all loans.

4. RESULTS

We summarize the hypotheses and empirical findings concerning the effect of an increase in
local credit risk on FHA shares of applications, originations, and FHA and conventional rejection
rates in Table 1. Estimation results are presented in Table 4, and marginal effects are presented
in Table 5. Marginal effects are calculated by evaluating the first derivatives of the respective
shares with respect to each independent variable evaluated at the overall means of the data.
Thus, the marginal effects provide an indication of the effects that a one-unit change in the
respective variables will have on the expected market shares. Because our primary interest is in
variables reflecting changes in cyclical and permanent risk, we examine these effects in turn.

4.1.

Cyclical Risk

Recall that increasing cyclical risk associated with a downturn in the local economy is measured
by increases in unemployment ∆

∆
(∆

, increases in state level bank credit card delinquencies

, and declines in the percentage change in house prices in the current or previous year

, or ∆

). We first examine the impact of an increase in cyclical risk on FHA and

conventional rejection rates. Consistent with the view that the FHA does not alter its
underwriting standards to reflect changes in local economic risk, we see that an increase in
cyclical risk certainly does not raise FHA rejection rates and may even lower them. Of the four
cyclical risk variables, only the coefficients capturing changes in house prices are significant, but
they have opposite signs. In addition, the marginal effects for changes in house prices indicate
that these factors essentially offset one another in the FHA rejection model. As discussed above,
this apparently counterintuitive effect of local cyclical risk indicators on FHA rejection rates
strongly suggests that lenders do not relax conventional underwriting standards in response to
an increase in risk.

Turning to the conventional rejection rate model, we also find mixed results for the variables
proxying for cyclical risk. Again, the variables for the changes in house prices have opposite
signs, whereas the conventional rejection rate is positively related to increases in
unemployment but negatively related to increases in the delinquency rate. Overall, the marginal
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effects indicate that factors associated with an increase in cyclical risk largely offset one another.
These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that lenders maintain underwriting
standards, which predicted a positive effect on conventional rejection rates in response to an
increase in local risk.

Comparing the FHA and conventional rejection rate models, we find that the marginal effects on
the estimated coefficients of variables capturing differences in cyclical risk in the FHA rejection
rate model are smaller than the corresponding marginal effects for the conventional rejection
rate model. For example, changes in the cyclical risk variables produce a shift between 0.16%

∆

and 1.37% ∆

in the conventional rejection rate, whereas similar changes in

cyclical risk variables only result in an 0.08% to 0.11% change in the FHA rejection rate. This
indicates that the FHA rejection rate is relatively less sensitive to changes in the local economic
environment than is the conventional rejection rate.

Turning to the share equations, it appears that increasing cyclical risk is generally associated
with an increase in the FHA share of originations and applications. For example, the marginal
effects show that a 1% decline in the percentage change in the local house price index in the
current and previous years results, respectively, in a 0.42% and 0.55% increase in the baseline
FHA share of originations. In addition, a 1% increase in the yearly percentage change in the
unemployment rate and delinquency rate results, respectively, in a 0.33% and 0.59% increase
in the baseline FHA share of originations. With the exception of the change in the
unemployment rate, we find similar effects for the FHA share of applications. Thus, the marginal
effects for cyclical risk factors indicate that FHA market shares of FHA-eligible originations and
applications do vary substantially with economic conditions. Taken together, the results for
cyclical risk factors for FHA applications and originations are consistent with the hypothesis that
conventional lenders do not lower lending standards to maintain their market share in response
to increases in cyclical risk.

4.2.

Permanent Risk

Turning to variables reflecting changing permanent risk, we begin by observing that the most
attractive indicator of permanent differences in credit risk is the standard deviation in the trend
rate of appreciation in house prices

∆

. The conventional rejection rate and FHA share of
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originations both vary directly with this indicator of risk, whereas the FHA rejection rate varies
inversely with it. This is strongly consistent with the non-price rationing hypothesis.

Expanding our attention to the full set of permanent risk variables, we find that areas with higher
historic average delinquency rates have a higher FHA market presence and higher conventional
rejection rates. The marginal effects indicate that historic delinquency rates play a large role in
altering FHA market shares and conventional rejection rates, confirming our prior expectations
concerning the effect of area risk on market share. For example, in New York–New Jersey, an
increase of one standard deviation in the historic delinquency rate translates into a 5-point
increase in FHA originations and application market shares. Furthermore, we find that a higher
permanent house price or equity risk is uniformly associated with higher FHA shares of both
applications and originations, which is consistent with the hypothesis that lenders do not alter
conventional underwriting behavior.

Turning to the FHA rejection rate model, we find economically weaker effects for our variables
proxying for areas with higher permanent risk than in the conventional rejection rate model. As
with the cyclical risk factors, this result is consistent with spatial uniformity of FHA underwriting
standards across geographic markets.

Table 6 presents simulation results showing the effect of a significant increase in cyclical and
permanent risk on FHA market share. Part A reports the baseline regional FHA market shares
for HUD reporting financial institutions. As expected, there is a wide variation in FHA market
shares across HUD regions. Part B simulates a short-term shock to the local economy by
increasing ∆

and ∆

by one standard deviation (simulating an increase in unemployment

and mortgage delinquency) and reducing ∆

and reducing ∆

by one standard deviation

(simulating a decline in property values). The results indicate an overall increase in FHA market
shares of originations and applications corresponding to a reduction in credit from conventional
lenders. Consistent with predictions from the marginal effects, we find that shifts in cyclical risk
factors appear to have a minimal impact on rejection rates. Part C shows the effect of an
increase in the permanent risk level for an area (permanent risk factors are increased by one
standard deviation), holding all other factors constant. Again, FHA market shares for
originations increase, but slightly less so than for a shock to cyclical risk factors. We also note
that FHA rejection rates decline slightly, whereas conventional rejection rates increase. As
summarized in Table 1, the empirical findings generally support the hypothesis that
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conventional lenders hold underwriting standards constant and fail to support the hypothesis
that conventional lenders relax underwriting standards to maintain their market share during
periods of increased risk.

4.3.

Minority Effects

It is interesting to note that as the percentage of minority households that apply for mortgages in
an area increases, the FHA market share of both originations and applications increases along
with rejection rates. The effects for the fraction of mortgage loans with black applicants might
have been anticipated based on the literature, suggesting that FHA insurance is differentially
attractive to minorities. Specifically, the marginal effects show that a 1% increase in the fraction
of black applicants in the previous year (

) raises the baseline FHA market share of

applications and originations by 0.54% and 0.45%, respectively. This indicates that low-risk
black applicants are more likely to choose FHA insurance, perhaps fearing rejection for
conventional mortgages or steering by real estate brokers or loan officers, or believing that the
FHA program offers an unbiased source of mortgage credit. The direct relation between FHA
and conventional rejection rates and the fraction of black applicants may reflect the higher
rejection rates experienced by minorities. However, the effects of our index of segregation of the
MSA residential population (BGINI) fail to reinforce the black percentage effects. Specifically,
MSAs with a more segregated population (higher BGINI) tend to have lower rejection rates for
conventional loans and lower FHA market shares of applications and originations.

4.4.

Regional and Financial Institution Effects

The main contribution of the estimated coefficients of the HUD regional dummy variables is to
demonstrate that, even after taking into account variables reflecting cyclical and permanent
components of credit risk, minority composition, and the composition of lenders active in the
mortgage market, substantial geographic variation in FHA shares and rejection rates remains. In
part, this geographic variation may result from differential effectiveness of the HUD field offices
located in each region. Consistent with the FHA market shares reported in Table 1, we see that
the Rocky Mountain and Northwest regions have the highest FHA market shares after
controlling for area risk factors. It is interesting to note that, although the Great Plains region has
one of the lowest FHA market shares, after controlling for area risk factors this region has a
significantly higher market share.
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The institutional market structure variables generally behave as expected. Given that the
lenders and mortgage originators reporting their lending activity to HUD are the reference group,
the FHA share of FHA-eligible originations should fall as the percentage of loans originated by
lenders reporting to other institutions rises. Thus, we see that FHA market shares of FHAeligible originations and applications are lower as the percentage of mortgages originated by
institutions that report to the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
increases.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper builds on existing literature on the microfoundations of choice between conventional
and FHA-insured mortgages. We formulate a model of the effects of location-specific variation in
credit risk on FHA market share. Our model allows us to utilize the FHA’s policy of ignoring
geographic variation in credit risk to explore the nature and effects of credit rationing by
conventional lenders.

Based on this theory, and using a combination of HMDA data recently expanded in terms of
coverage to include most FHA lenders and data from the FHA system itself, we estimate a
series of four simple reduced-form models: FHA share of applications and originations, and FHA
and conventional rejection rates. Taken together, these indirect tests strongly suggest that
conventional mortgage lending criteria are not relaxed in areas experiencing recession or
longer-term decline. Instead, conventional underwriting criteria are either maintained or
tightened in the face of local recession, and FHA and conventional shares respond accordingly.
Apparently conventional mortgage suppliers reject the possibility of relaxing underwriting criteria
and raising mortgage insurance prices to preserve market share in declining areas. For home
buyers seeking housing priced at or below the recently increased FHA maximum mortgage
amount, FHA insurance is available to maintain mortgage credit supply during recessions or
longer declines. For housing priced significantly above the FHA mortgage limit, the effects of
non-price rationing of conventional mortgages may be more pronounced.
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We also find that the composition of lenders active in the market and the racial composition of
the MSA have an impact on FHA market share. These results should not surprise those familiar
with the literature on the role of FHA. Finally, it appears that there is considerable geographic
variation in FHA market share remaining to be explained in future research.
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Figure 3
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